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396 COLEMAN ENGINEERING CO. fl. [65 C.2d 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INO. 
[L. A. No. 28824. In Bank. Dec. 12, 1966.] 
COLEMAN ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff 
and Respondent, v. NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, 
INC., Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Building and Construction Contracts-Damages-Compensation 
for Extra Work.-When a contractor, acting reasonably, is 
misled by incorrect plans and specifications issued by another 
contracting party as the basis for bids and, as a result, submits 
a lower bid than he would otherwise make, he may recover in a 
contract action for extra work necessitated by the in~orrect 
plans and specifications. 
[2] Contracts-Agreement to Make Future Contracts.-Generally, 
when an essential element of a promise is reserved for the 
future' agreement of both parties, the promise gives rise to no 
legal obligation until the future agreement is made. 
[3] Id.-Agreement to Make Future Contract.-The enforceability 
of a contract containing a promise to agree depends on the 
relative importance and the severability of the matter left to 
the future; it is a question of degree and may be settled by 
det~rmining whether the indefinite promise is so essential to 
the bargain that inability to enforce that promise strictly 
according to its terms would make unfair the enforcement of 
the remainder of the agreement. 
[4] Id.-Agreement to Make Future Contract: Performance-Obli-
gation.-Where matters left for future agreement are unessen-
tial to a contract, each party will be forced to accept a reason-
able determination of the unsettled points or, if possible, the 
unsettled points may be left unperformed and the remainder of 
the contract enforced. 
[5] Id.-Definiteness-Price: Building and Construction Contracts 
-Construction and Effect.-The effect to be given to a provi-
sion in a building contract for adjustment of price to the 
mutual satisfaction of the parties in the event of a change in 
specifications should not be determined merely from the writ-
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 48; Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 26. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Building and Construction Contracts, - -----
§ 37; [2, 3] Contracts, § 118; [4] Contracts, §§ 118, 211; [5] Con-
tracts, § 115; Building and Construction Contracts, § 7; [6] Build-
ing and Construction Contracts, §§ 7, 18; [7] Building and Con-
struction Contracts, §§ 8, 18; [8] Building and Construction Con-
tracts, § 13; [9, 10] Damages, § 34; [11] Damages, §§ 29, 34; 
[12] Damages, § 42; [13] Appeal and Error, § 1679. 
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ten agreement itself, but should depend on the changes 
requested. 
[6] Building and Construction Contracts-Construction and Effect: 
Change.-Where a provision in a building contract for change 
orders contains an agreement to agree in the future as to price, 
the contract is not invalid from the outset; the validity of the 
provision for changes depends on later events. 
[7] ld.-Performance: Change.-Under a building contract subject 
to change orders and containing an agreement to agree in the 
future as to the price for changes, when later changes are 
minor or of not great magnitude, the contractor must perform 
and obtain a judicial determination as to the price; when the 
changes are of great magnitude in relation to the entire con-
tract, the contractor must negotiate in good faith to settle the 
price. If he does so, he is not required to continue to perform 
absent a price agreement. 
[8] ld. - Performance - Sufficiency. - Under a building contract 
subject to change orders and im agreement as to the price for 
changes, plaintiff-contractor was not required to continue 
performance absent an agreement as to the price where the 
record supported the court's determinations that defendant's 
change in specifications, because of its nature, magnitude and 
effect, ran to the entire consideration of the contract and that 
plaintiff acted fairly in negotiating the price after the change 
order. 
[9] Damages-Interest.-Aside from any contractual provision, 
interest is awarded as damages by way of compensation for 
wrongful detention of money due plaintiff, but the allowance of 
such interest only occurs when the sum is liquidated within 
the meaning of Civ. Code, § 3287. 
[10] ld.-Interest.-A slight difference between the amount of 
damages claimed and the amount awarded does not preclude an 
award of prejudgment interest, and the erroneous omission of a 
few matters from the account or erroneous calculation of costs 
does not mean that the damages are not capable of being made 
certain by calculation. . 
[~1] ld.-Mitigation: Interest.-Reductions in damages due to 
plaintiff's efforts to mitigate damages should not preclude an 
award of prejudgment interest. 
[12] ld.-Interest-Allowance in Actions on Building Contracts.-
Although a contract for the engineering and manufacturing of 
trailers to accommodate a missile allowed the contractor 
to recover the cost of expenses reasonably necessary to prepare 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d. Building and Construction Contracts, § 4; 
Am.Jur.2d. Building and Construction Contracts, § 4 . 
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settlement claims in the event the contract was terminated, 
such expenses would obviously not be incurred until after the 
termination of the contract, and the court erred in awarding 
interest from the date of termination on the portion of the 
contractor's .damages attributable to settlement expenses. The 
interest on this portion of the award should date only from 
the judgment. 
[13] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Failure to Find on 
Issues.-Code Civ. Proc., § 634, does not require a finding on 
every minute matter on which evidence is received at the trial; 
and a court's refusal to make specific findings on every 
matter proposed in appellant's counterfindings did not require 
a reversal of the judgment where the findings made sufficiently 
disposed of all basic issues raised. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying motion to vacate 
the judgment and to enter a new and different judgment. 
Alfred E.,Paonessa, Judge. Judgment modified and affirmed; 
order affirmed. 
Action for damages for recovery of costs in part perform. 
ance of a manufacturing and engineering contract as to which 
there were significant specification changes. Judgment for 
plaintiff modified and affirmed. 
Flint & MacKay, Arch R. Tuthill and Philip M. Battaglia 
for Defendant and Appellant. ' 
Milo V. Olson for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
PETERS, J.-Defendant, North American Aviation, Inc., 
appeals from a judgment awarding plaintiff, Coleman Engi-
neering Company, Inc" damages in the amount of $289,615.89 
plus interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum from Decem-
ber 10, 1959. Defendant also appeals from the order denying 
its motion to vacate the judgment and to enter a new and 
different jUdgment. 
In January 1959, defendant invited bids for the engineering 
and manufacturing of 32 positioning or lift trailers and 7 
transportation trailers to accommodate its Hound Dog Missile. 
'With the invitation to bid, defendant submitted its basic 
equipment specifications. Section 3.2.2.9 of the spccifications 
contained a description of the "configuration of the pay-
load," namely, "a 36.5 inch dia. cylindrical payload configur-
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ation, the longitudinal centerline of which shall coincide with 
the trailer centerline in the plane of the rail top surfaces." 
References to configuration of the payload are also found in 
other specifications, namely, a provision dealing with load rails 
refers to "payloads of various configurations," the intended 
use provision refers to "missiles or special payloads for air-
craft and missiles" and a provision designated loaded sta-
bility states that part of the payload is "at a point 46 inches 
above the rail top surfaces. " 
The configuration of the payload is important in the light of 
the following fundamental engineering principle: The center 
of gravity "of an object generally stated is its balance point. 
It may be considered in three planes-vertical, lateral, and 
fore and aft. Its location depends generally upon the weight, 
material and configuration of the object. Its location will vary 
among objects of the same weight and material if these con-
figurations are different. All these principles are elementary 
among design engineers. " 
All of the engineers testified that, if there were no other 
specification relating to configuration, an engineer could rea-
sonably interpret specmcation section 3.2.2.9 as locating the 
vertical payload center of gravity at rail height. However the 
expert witnesses of the parties differed as to the effect to be 
given to the other provisions mentioned relating to configu-
'ration of payload. Plaintiff's experts testified in effect that 
section 3.2.2.9 established the center of gravity at rail height 
and the further provisions did not establish any other center 
of gravity. Defendant's experts claimed that the inclusion of 
the further provisions compelled the conclusion that section 
3.2.2.9 does not state the center of gravity, and that instead 
the specifications must be understood as not stating any verti-
cal location for the center of gravity of the payload. 
In February plaintiff submitted its bid to defendant. With 
the bid, plaintiff transmitted a preliminary stress analysis 
report which interpreted defendant's specifications as locating 
the vertical center of gravity of the payload in the plane of 
the rail top surfaces. This was filed by defendant's engineers 
but they did not read it. 
On June 23, 1959, defendant sent plaintiff five" go ahead" 
telegrams, informing it that it was the successful bidder.1 
Plaintiff then started the design and engineering of the 
IThese telegrams limited the liability to be incurred by defendant prior 
to formal acceptance of the bid. 
) 
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trailers. On July 6 defendant delivered to plaintiff a series of 
purchase orders, which, according to the pleadings of both 
parties, constitute the contract between them. The purchase 
orders state a total price of $527,632 and provide for delivery 
of trailers to 'commence on September 15 and contain the same 
equipment specifications with regard to configuration of the 
payload as found in the equipment specifications in the invita-
tion to bid. The purchase orders provided for "a binding 
contract on the terms set forth herein when it is accepted 
either by acknowledgment or delivery." 
The purchase orders also state in paragraph 9, captioned 
"CHANGES," that "Buyer reserves the right at any time to 
make changes in drawings and specifications, in methods of 
shipment and packaging, in schedules, and the place of 
delivery ~ to any material and/or work covered by this order. 
In such event there will be made an equitable adjustment in 
price and time of performance mutually satisfactory to Buyer 
and Seller, but any claim by Seller·for an adjustment must be 
made within thirty (30) days of the receipt of such changes." 
Each purchase order also states that it is the entire contract, 
that no changes are binding on buyer unless evidenced by a 
duly executed purchase order, and that buyer may terminate 
at any time in accordance with section 8-706 of the Armed 
Services Procurement Regulation. The regulation provides, as 
applicable here, for payment of expenses and a certain profit 
to the subcontractor upon such termination. 
The president of plaintiff did not sign and return the copies 
of the purchase orders to defendant until July 15,1959. Mean-
while, at a meeting of engineers of plaintiff and defendant on 
JUly 7, the engineers of defendant stated that it desired the 
trailers to be designed to accommodate a payload center of 
gravity 35 inches above the rail top surfaces. When the 
engineers of plaintiff stated that it had bid on the contract on 
the basis that the specification placed the center of gravity at 
rail height and had so indicated in its stress report attached to 
its bid, defendant's engineers admitted that they had not read 
that report. Plaintiff's engineers also stated at that time that 
their work had been based on the assumption of a vertical 
center of gravity at rail height, that the changing of the center 
of gravity would entail an increase in costs and a delay in 
schedule, and that plaintiff desired a change in specifications 
defining the location of the center of gravity if defendant 
wanted it at a place other than the top of the load rails. The 
engineer in charge for defendant requested that work continue 
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on the trailers and stated that changes in the specifications 
would be forthcoming. 
Several meetings were thereafter held between engineers of 
the parties, and several proposed changes in specifications 
were prepared. On October 5, 1959, defendant supplied plain-
tiff with a telegraphic change in specifications wherein the 
center of gravity was located at 35 inches above rail height. 
The change in specifications caused a significant change in 
the engineering, design and cost of construction; the increase 
in costs was at least $257,000. Upon receipt of the telegraphic 
change of October 5, plaintiff requested an adjustment in price 
and time for performance before continuing performance. 
Plaintiff sought recovery of costs expended to the date of the 
receipt of the telegraphic change and the reasonable expenses 
of constructing the trailers in accordance with the changed 
specifications. Plaintiff first sought to raise the contract price 
to over a million dollars, and also offered as an alternative to 
change the contractual arrangement from "fixed-price to fixed-
price with redetermination or to a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee at a 
point to be agreed upon." Plaintiff urged that repricing of 
the contract was essential because of the long delays while 
waiting for the change order and the numerous starts and 
stops caused thereby, interim price increases by vendors, 
changes in the anticipated number of units to be ordered, and 
the many conferences as to the changes. During these negoti-
ations the position of defendant was that plaintiff had made a 
mistake by underbidding and was looking to defendant to 
"bail" it out. Defendant refused to pay more than a 10 
percent increase ~n the contract price, an increase of approxi-
mately $52,000 which would have raised the contract price to 
approximately $580,000. 
Plaintiff ~ a letter to defendant took the position that 
continuation of the contract without obtaining its price for the 
changes could mean financial disaster to it and that unless a 
settlement could. be reached on the bases it had suggested it 
would have to stop work on November 5, 1959, and it then 
would seek recovery under the provision of the contract 
providing for" Termination for Convenience. " 
Defendant replied that under the purchase orders plaintiff 
was entitled only to the costs of the changes and that if plain-
tiff terminated work, the termination would not constitute a 
termination for convenience but a breach. As a result of subsf'-
quent conferences, plaintiff did not stop work on November i3, 
) 
) 
./ 
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but instead submitted a new cost breakdown of the contract as 
changed. In a letter accompanying' this breakdown dated 
November 10, 1959, plaintiff took the position that it would 
not agree to arriving at a price on the theory of a comparison 
between the cost breakdown of every item before the change as 
compared to a cost breakdown of every item after the change. 
The letter explained this position as follows: As to engineer-
ing costs, it had from the beginning recognized that a ehange 
was necessary and approached the problem of design from that 
viewpoint, but the exact details of the ehange were unknown. 
Because of the necessary stoppages and reanalyzation costs 
increased, and after the change was made the engineers were 
required to reanalyze every part going into the trailer to 
determine whether it had to be changed. As to manufacturing, 
plaintiff took the position that in making its bid it had 
obtained price estimates from its vendors, that the bid was 
based upon these quotations, that because of the impending 
change order and to save money it was unable to place its 
orders with its vendors until the change was decided upon, 
and that in the interim there were changes in prices on a 
number of articles, including some that were not affected by 
the change c;>rders. . 
In this letter plaintiff also offered to permit a government 
audit office to examine the costs and to abide by its decision. 
The letter also states that plaintiff will continue its engineer-
ing work to completion but will otherwise stop work. 
Defendant rejected plaintiff's price breakdown as inade-
quate and stated that it was willing to negotiate further but 
that unless plaintiff resumed work by November 18, it would 
be compelled to conclude that plaintiff had breached the 
contract and would seek procurement of the trailers elsewhere. 
After plaintiff refused to continue further without determina-
tion of the price for the change order, defendant on November 
19 wired that it considered the work stoppage a breach and 
would seek to procure the trailers elsewhere. 
On December 1 and 4, plaintiff made further offers substan-
tially reducing the price based on lower cost estimates and 
some changes in the design of the trailers. Defendant replied 
011 December 8, that it had placed contracts at another source 
for the delivery of the trailers and could not consider those 
offers. 
Defendant contracted with another firm for construction of 
the trailers at a cost of over $800,000, some $28,000 more than 
the amount of plaintiff's last offer. On March 29, 1960, plain-
·-._A_ ...... _. 
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tiff submitted to defendant its termination claim of 
$296,783.03 for expenses incurred in performing the contract. 
The trial court determined that the contract was entered 
into on July 6, 1959, when defendant delivered the purchase. 
orders to plaintiff, that the specifications of the contract place 
the center of gravity of the payload at rail height, that the 
engineers of defendant after the conference on July 7 
requested plaintiff to continue work and said change orders 
would be forthcoming, that the change in specifications caused 
a significant change in the engineering, design and construc-
tion of the trailer units which cost at least $257,000, that 
plaintiff after receipt of the change acted in good faith in 
seeking an adjustment in the contract price before proceeding 
further in performance of the contract, that in the circum-
stances of this case the covenant providing for changes and 
adjustment of price was not an independent covenant but had 
to be complied with by the parties before defendant could 
require plaintiff to proceed with the contract, that the change 
because of its nature, magnitude and effect, ran to the entire 
consideration of the contract, that defendant knew that plain-
tiff's request for an adjustment in price :was not unreasonable, 
that plaintiff and not defendant acted fairly in the negoti-
ations after the change order, that any mistake made during 
the execution of the contract was a mistake caused by defend-
ant not plaintiff, that plaintiff did not underbid in its initial 
bid, and that plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of 
$289,615.89. The court denied recovery on a counterclaim by 
defendant in which it had sought to recover the difference 
between the' contract price with plaintiff and the cost of 
obtaining the trailers elsewhere, $381,109.74. 
Defendant attacks the determination of the trial court that 
the contract as originally entered into placed the vertical 
center of gravity of the payload at rail height. It is also 
contended that the trial court's finding that the contract came 
into existence on JUly 6, 1959, is not supported by the evi-
dence, and that the undisputed evidence establishes that the 
contract did not come into existence until Ju1y 15, which wa~ 
after defendant '8 engineers notified plaintiff that the center of 
gravity would be at a point some 35 inches above the rail 
height. 
It is unnecessary to discuss in detail these contentions 
because, first, other facts found by the trial court and 
supported by the evidence require a conclusion that the 
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contract as originally entered into did not provide for a verti. 
cal center of gravity at a point 35 inches above rail height, 
and, second, it is immaterial whether the contract came into 
existence on July 6 or July 15. 
[1] A contractor who, acting reasonably, is misled by 
incorrect plans and specifications issued by another contract-
ing party as the basis for bids and who, as a result, submits a 
bid which is lower than he would otherwise have made may 
recover in a contract action for extra work necessitated by the 
incorrect plans and specifications. (Cf. Souza &; McCue 
Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Ca1.2d 508, 510 [20 Cal. 
Rptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338] ; MacIsaac &; Menke Co. v. Cardoz 
Corp., 193 Cal.App.2d 661,669 [14 Cal.Rptr. 523].) 
There is nothing in the written specifications or contract 
which could be reasonably interpreted to require the· vertical 
center of gravity at 35 inches above the rail height, and 
defendant does not urge that the specifications or written 
contract so require, but merely claims that the specifications 
viewed as a whole are ambiguous. Furthermore, even assuming 
that the inspection of the missile by engineers of plaintiff 
might indicate that the vertical center of gravity of the pay-
load was not at rail height, the inspection could not be held to 
require plaintiff, in the absence of further information, to 
locate the center of gravity at a point 35 inches above the rails 
or any substantial distance above the rails. 
There was no understanding reached by the parties prior to 
JUly 15 fixing the vertical center of gravity of the payload at 
on point 35 inches above the rail height. At the meeting on July 
7, defendant made clear its position that it desired such a 
location, and plaintiff made clear its position that its bid had 
been based on a vertical center of gravity at rail height, that 
its stress analysis report had so indicated, that the work so far 
done had been based on a vertical center of gravity at rail 
height, and that adjustment to a different height would 
require substantial changes. 
The court found, and the finding is supported by the evi-
dence, that after the July 7 meeting "defendant requested 
plaintiff to contiuue working on the project, the subject matter 
of the contract, and stated that changed specifications would 
be forthcoming from defendant to plaintiff." It is clear that 
after the so-called mistake was discovered defendant did not 
seek to withdraw its purchase orders but to the contrary took 
the position that performance should continue and that 
changes would be made in the specifications. The purchase 
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orders, as we have seen, permitted defendant to require 
changes with a mutually satisfactory adjustment in price and 
time for performance, and under the circumstances it must be 
concluded that the contract entered into by the parties did not 
provide for a vertical center of gravity 35 inches above the 
rails and that the fixing of the vertical center of gravity at a 
location satisfactory to defendant was to be accomplished by a 
change in specific a tions. 
The next question is whether plaintiff was entitled to stop 
work until an agreement was reached on the price to be 
charged because of the change order. This question primarily 
involves the effect to be given to the provisions of section 9 of 
the purchase orders that defendant may make changes in the 
specifications and that in "such event there will be made an 
equitable adjustment in price and time of performance mutu-
ally satisfactory to Buyer and Seller." (Italics added.) , 
[2] The general rule is that if an "essential element" of a 
promise is reserved for the future agreement of both parties, 
the promise gives rise to no legal obligation until such future 
agreement is made. (Ablett v. Olauson, 43 Ca1.2d 280, 284-285 
[272 P.2d 753]; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Oourt, 51 
Ca1.2d 423, 433 [333 P .2d 745].) [3] "The enforceability 
of a contract containing a promise to agree depends upon the 
relative importance and the severability of the matter left to 
the future; it is a question of degree and may be settled by 
determining whether the indefinite promise is so essential to 
the bargain that inability to enforce that promise strictly 
according to its terms would make unfair the enforcement of 
the remainder of the agreement. [Citations.] [4] Where the 
matters left for future agreement are unessential, each party 
will be forced to accept a reasonable determination of the 
unsettled point or if possible the unsettled point may be left 
unperformed and the remainder of the contract be enforced. 
[Citations.]" (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Oourt, supra, 
51 Ca1.2d 423,433; Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt, 59 
Ca1.2d 159,194 [28 Cal.Rptr. 724,379 P.2d 28].) 
Application of these rules to provisions governing change 
orders in a building contract where the price for the changes 
is subject to mutual satisfaction is difficult because ordinarily 
it cannot be determined at the time of entry into the agree-
ment or until change orders are sought whether the provisions 
governing change orders are or are not an "essential ele-
ment" of the agreement. It is undesirable to hold the entire 
.~) 
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contract unenforceable when there may be no need for change \ 
orders or the change orders are insubstantial in relation to the 
balance of the agreement. On the other hand, where the change 
orders are substantial in relation to the remainder of the 
agreement so that the provision for change orders becomes an 
"essential element" of the contract, it is often unfair to 
require a party to perform while awaiting a reasonable deter-
mination as to price. The change orders may require matters 
which the contractor may not be equipped to produce except at 
an unreasonable cost or may require such an increase in costs 
that progress payments may be essential for the protection of 
the contractor. The last alternative suggested above, leaving 
the unsettled point unperformed and enforcing the balance of 
the contract, would obviously result in unfairness to a contrac-
tor where he is compelled to incur substantial expenses as a 
result of change orders and denied any payment. 
[5] Because the relative importance of the change provi-
sion of the agreement cannot be known until changes are 
sought, we are satisfied that the effect to be given to the provi-
sion for adjustment of price to the mutual satisfaction of the 
parties should not be determined merely from the written 
agreement. itself but should depend upon the changes re-
quested. [6] Accordingly, where a provision for changes 
contains an agreement to agree in the future as to price,the 
contract is not invalid from the outset, and the validity of the 
provision for changes depends upon subsequent events. [7] Un-
doubtedly, if the subsequent changes are minor or of not 
great magnitude the contractor must perform and obtain a 
subsequent judicial determination as to the price of the 
changes. However, where the changes are of great magnitude 
in relation to the entire contract, the contractor must negotiate 
in good faith to settle the price (cf. Comunale v. Traders &; 
General Ins. Co., 50 Ca1.2d 654, 658 [328 P.2d 198] [there is 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every 
contract] ), and where he has done so, he is not required to 
continue performance in the absence of an agreement as to the 
prIce. 
Cases relied upon by defendant, such as Snow Mountain W. 
&; P. Co. v. Kraner, 191 Cal. 312, 316-318 [216 P. 589], are not 
controlling because change order clauses therein either did not 
contain a provision that the price of the change would be fixed 
to the mutual satisfaction of the parties but instead contained 
a formula for determination of the price (cost plus a per-
centage of cost) or, if the price was to be fixed by. future 
) 
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agreement, there was also an express provision to continue 
performance in the absence of the agreement. 
[8] In the instant case, the court concluded that the 
challge, because of its nature, magnitude, and effect, ran to the 
entire consideration of the contract (see Medico-Dental etc. 
Co. v. Horton &- Oonverse, 21 Ca1.2d 411,419 [132 P.2d 457]), 
and that plaintiff acted fairly in its negotiations after the 
change order. Both of these determinations are supported by 
the record. For this reason plaintiff was not required to 
continue performance in the absence of an agreement as to 
price. 
Defendant makes a number of attacks on the amount of 
damages awarded. Some of these contentions are based on the 
claim that plaintiff's original bid would have resulted in a loss 
to it. This contention is witJtout merit. The court found that 
plaintiff did not underbid, and there is substantial evidence 
that had the original contract been performed without change, 
plaintiff would have made a substantial profit. 
Defendant also urges that the damages awarded violate sub-
paragraph (e) of section 8-706 of the Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulation (incorporated by reference into the purchase 
orders), which limits recovery of the seller to the contract 
price. It is asserted that the damages awarded with regard to 
two of the purchase orders exceed the contract price of those 
orders. However, the conduct of the parties and their plead-
ings show that the purchase orders did not create severable 
contracts but constituted only a single contract for $527,632. 
The damages awarded were well below that figure. 
Defendant next attacks the award of interest. Section 3287 
of the Civil Code provides that any person who is entitled to 
recover" damages certain, or capable of being made certain by 
calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him 
upon a particular day," is entitled to recover interest thereon. 
[9] Aside from any contractual provision, interest is 
awarded as damages by way of compensation for wrongful 
detention of money due plaintiff. Of course, the allowance of 
such interest only occurs when the sum is liquidated within 
the meaning of section 3287. (Amco Oonstr. Co. v. Ocean View 
Estates, Inc., 169 Cal.App.2d 235,238 [337 P.2d 146].) 
It has been held that in a cost-plus building contract the 
amount due is capable of ascertainment by calculation so that 
an award of interest for a period prior to judgment is proper. 
(Anselmo v. Sebastiani, 219 Cal. 292, 301-303 [26 P.2d 1] ; 
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Maurice L. Rein, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 157 Cal.App.2d 
670, 686-688 [321 P.2d 753].) As we have seen, section 8-706 
provides as applicable here that the subcontractor shall recover 
his costs and a certain percentage for profit where the contrac-
tor terminates under the power it reserved in the contract. The 
contract thus provides in effect that payment shall be made on 
a cost-plus basis, and except for the possibility that certain 
expenses are not subject to calculation, there does not appear 
to be any reason to refuse to apply here the rule governing 
cost-plus contracts generally. 
MacIsaac &- Menke 00. v. Oardox Oorp., supra, 193 CaLApp. 
2d 661, 673-674, relied upon by defendant, does not establish a 
contrary rule. The basis of damages in that case was the 
, 'value" of extra work done under the peculiar circumstances 
present, a~d the court pointed out that such circumstances 
"precluded ascertainment of the cost of the work by computa-
tion. " 
Among the items of expense attacked by defendant are the 
, 'Engineering Burden" which is calculated as a percentage of 
the cost of the engineering labor, the "Material Procurement 
Burden" which is a percentage of direct materials and 
outside engineering expense, and the "General and Adminis-
trative Expenses" which is a percentage of direct labor and 
burden. Defendant does not now (and did not at the trial) 
attack the amounts of these costs or the percentages used. The 
percentages involved are fixed by government auditors as the 
share that the project should bear of all of plaintiff's indirect 
and overhead costs. These percentages are subject to periodic 
audit by the government and change from time to time. It is 
apparent that these items of expense are derived by calcula-
tion from costs incurred by plaintiff. 
Defendant next urges that interest should not have been 
awarded because plaintiff's original demand of damages 
exceeded the amount awarded. The approximate net amount of 
the excess was around $7,000. The reasons for this excess were 
that after the original demand there was a minor adjustment 
in the engineering burden percentage, a few matters were 
omitted from the original demand in error, plaintiff was able 
to settle some claims of its subcontractors for less than the full 
amount of the claims, and plaintiff was able to salvage some 
materials. [10] The mere fact that there is a slight differ-
ence between the amount of damages claimed and the amount 
awarded does not preclude an award of prejudgment interest 
(Koyer v. Detroit Fire &- Marine Ins. 00., 9 Ca1.2d 336, 345 
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[70 P.2d 927]), and the erroneous omission of a few matters 
from the account or erroneous ealculation of the costs do not 
mean that the damages are not capable of being made certain 
by calculation. 
[11] With regard to the reduction in damages due to 
settlement of claims and salvage of materials, it has been held 
in an analogous situation that offsets of the defendant, even 
where unliquidated, do not preclude the allowance of interest 
on the balance of the plaintiff's claim (Hansen v. Covell, 218 
Cal. 622, 629-631 [24 P.2d 772, 89 A.L.R. 670] ; McCowen v. 
Pew, 18 Cal.App. 482,483 et seq. [123 P. 354] ; see Lineman v. 
Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 212 [195 P. 408, 4 A.L.R.2d 1380]), 
and we are satisfied that reductions in damages due to plain-
tiff's efforts to mitigate damages should not preclude an 
award of prejudgment interest. If the rule were otherwise, a 
plaintiff might be encouraged to forego opportunities to miti-
gate damages so as not to jeopardize his right to prejudgment 
interest. 
The percentage of profit to be allowed is set forth in section 
8-706, and defendant's contention that the profits to be allowed 
may not be:determined by calculation is also without merit. 
Defendarit also urges that no interest is recoverable on a 
termination claim under section 8-706. This contention is based 
on cases which disallow claims of interest against the govern-
ment. Obviously defendant is not the government, and so the 
cited cases are not applicable. 
[12] There is merit, however, in defendant's contention 
that the court erred insofar as it awarded interest from the 
date of termination on the portion of the damages, approxi-
mately $18,000, attributable to settlement" expenses. Although 
section 8-706 allows recovery of the cost of expenses reasonably 
necessary to the preparation of settlement claims, these 
expenses were obviously not incurred until after the date of 
termination. Interest is not intended to be a windfall. Interest 
on this portion of the award should date only from the jm}g-
ment. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to 
make findings on 66 matters although requested by defendant 
to do so. The counterfindings filed by defendant and its objec-
tion to the proposed findings total almost 70 pages. In many " 
respects the counterfindings and objections are directly or 
impliedly contrary to the findings made by the court, relate 
merely to evidentiary matters, or deal with immaterial 
matters. At the end of the counterfindings and objections, 
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defendant "requests specific findings of fact and conclusions 
of law on all of the issues, both of fact and of law, which are 
raised by and which are the subject of and which are included 
in the Counter-Findings and Counter-Conclusions set forth 
herein." No other specification was made as to the issues upon' 
which defendant sought additional findings. 
[13] We have examined the findings of the trial court in 
the light of the criticisms made in defendant's brief and are 
satisfied that the findings sufficiently dispose of all of the basic 
issues raised. The findings proposed by defendant, insofar as 
they" may be deemed additional findings and are not directly 
contrary to the findings made, deal with evidentiary matters 
fmd, even if the matters therein were found in favor of 
defendant, would not require judgment in its favor. Section 
634 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not require that a 
finding be made as to every minute matter on which evidence 
is received at the trial, and under the circumstances the 
refusal of the court to make specific findings on every matter 
proposed in defendant's counterfindings does not require a 
reversal of the judgment.2 
The judgment should be modified by eliminating the award 
of interest prior to judgment on the settlement expenses. The 
trial court "is directed to modify its judgment accordingly, 
and, as so modified, the judgment and order appealed from"are 
affirmed. Plaintiff to recover its costs on appeal. 
McComb, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., and White, J.,. con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-I dissent. 
In my opinion, the parties attempted to enter into a formal 
2Section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: 
, 'In all cases where findings are" to be made, a copy of the proposed 
findings shall be served upon all parties to the action and the court shall 
not sign any findings therein prior to the expiration of 10 days atter such 
service. The court may direct a party to prepare findings. 
, 'Within 10 days after such service any other party may serve and file 
objections, counterfindings and requests for special findings. 
"If upon appeal or upon a motion under Section 657 or 663 of this 
code it appears that the court has not made findings as to all facta 
necessary to support the judgment, or that the findings are ambiguous 
or conflicting upon a material issue of fact, the court before which such 
appeal or motion is pending shall not infer that the trial court found in 
favor of the prevailing party on such issue if it appears that the party 
attacking the judgment made a written request for a specific finding on 
such issue either prior to the entry of judgment or in conjunction with 
a motion under Section 663 of this code.' I 
·Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assip-
mont by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. " . 
i I • 
, I 
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contract and erroneously believed that they had done so. Cer-
tain essential elements were left to future agreement, however, 
and an agreement "'as never reached. 
The majority opinion applies the "essential element" test, 
long used exclusively to determine the enforceability of agree-
ments to agree, not to determine the enforceability of such an 
agreement, but to hold that agreement on new terms was a 
condition precedent to plaintiff Coleman's duty to continue 
performance under the contract. If there is no initial agree-
ment on essential elements, however, there is no contract to 
which a condition precedent can attach. 
The only enforceable contract between the parties was the 
one manifested by the five "go ahead" telegrams received and 
acted upon by Coleman on June 24, 1959. The telegrams con-
tained new proposals and were therefore counteroffers to Cole-
man's bid. (Civ. Code, § 1585; A.merican Aeronautics Corp. v. 
Grand Central Aircraft Co., 155 Cal.App.2d 69, 80 [317 P.2d 
694] ; Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston, 123 Cal.App.2d 300, 310 
[266 P.2d 856] ; 1 Corbin, Contracts (1963 ed.) § 89, pp. 378-
382.) When new terms are proposed, no contract arises unless 
the original offeror accepts the counteroffer. (Lawrence Block 
Co. v. Palston, supra; Apablasa v. Merritt ({7 Co., 176 Cal.App. 
2d 719, 726 [1 Cal.Rptr. 500].) If, as here, the offer specifies 
no particular mode of acceptance and has as its object the 
beginning of performance, the offeree's beginning of perform-
ance constitutes an acceptance. (Rest.2d Contracts (Tent. 
Draft No.1) § 52, coms. b, c, pp. 216-218. See Logoluso v. 
Logoluso, 233 Cal.App.2d 523, 529 [43 Cal.Rptr. 678] ; Stan-
dard Iron Works v. Globe Jewelry ({7 Loan, Inc., 164 Cal.App. 
2d 108, 117 [330 P.2d 271]. Cf. Beatty v. Oakland Sheet Metal 
Supply Co., 111 Cal.App.2d 53, 62-63 [244 P.2d 25].) 
The telegrams made clear that final arrangements were still 
to be made. Pending those arrangements, however, Coleman 
was to. begin operations with the understanding that no more 
than $40,000 worth of performance was presently authorized. 
The terms of this agreement included the specifications which, 
according to the findings, Coleman reasonably interpreted as 
calling for a payload center of gravity at rail height. 
The facts found by the trial court establish that no other 
contract ever came into being between Coleman and North 
American. On July 6, 1959, Coleman received from North 
American the purchase orders referred to in the telegrams. 
The . purchase orders stated that they became a binding 
412 COLEMAN ENGINEERING CO. V. [65 C.2d 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. 
contract on the terms set forth therein when C C accepted either 
by acknowledgment or delivery .... " The trial court erred 
in construing this language to mean delivery of the purchase 
orders to Coleman and in finding that a contract therefore 
existed as of July 6. 
It is a question of law whether the facts found gave rise to a 
contract. (Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal.App.2d 711, 721 [197 
P.2d 807].) The purchase orders, like the telegrams, contained 
new and important terms and were therefore a new offer. 1 In 
such a setting, the term "delivery" cannot reasonably be con· 
strued as delivery of the purchase orders to Coleman, for such 
a construction would have given North American the power to 
close an agreement to which Coleman never assented merely by 
delivering the terms to Coleman. (See Lawrence Block Co. v. 
Pals ton, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d at p. 310.) "Delivery" must 
therefore mean delivery of the specified items. Delivery of 
goods is a mode of acceptance commonly recognized in 
commercial dealings (see, e.g., Com. Code, § 2206), although in 
this case such a means of acceptance was probably not contem. 
plated because of the length of time required for performance. 
The contract also provided for acceptance by c, acknowledg- . 
ment" of receipt of the purchase orders, and acknowledgment 
copies were provided.2 
On July 15, the president of Coleman acknowledged the 
purchase orders by signing and sending them to North Amer-
ican. Ordinarily this action would be an acceptance by 
Coleman of all the terms of the contract. According to the 
findings of the trial court, however, "on July 7, 1959, at a 
conference between engineers of defendant [North American] 
lThe original invitation to bid sent to Coleman by North American 
stated c, If you are the successful bidder, you will be offered a purchase 
order .••. II (Italics added.) 
2Although each purehase order sent to Coleman contained in small 
print the recital that it would become a binding contraet when accepted 
"either by acknowledgment or delivery," it advised in much larger 
print, "PLEASE SIGN ACKNOWLEDGMENT or THIS PURCHASE ORDEB AND 
RETURN IMMEDIATELY ATTENTION: PURCHASING DEPARTMENT." Aeeom-
panying each purchase order was a separate sheet entitled "ACKNOWL-
EDGMENT OJ' PURCHASE OlWER," providing space for the offeree-seIler's 
signature over the repeated designation, "ACKNOWLEDOMENT--RETURN 
IMMEDIATELY TO PURCHASING DEPARTMENT." Even more significantly, 
each of the five" go ahead" telegrams received by Coleman on .July 24 
declared that North American's contractual liability would be limited 
to a specified figure "pending formal execution of confirming purchase 
order and yO'Ur acknowledgment thereof" (italics added). In ascertain-
ing the intent of parties to a contract the written portions, e.g., the 
telegrams in the case at bar, control its printed portions, e.g., the mention 
of "delivery" in the purchase order form. (Civ. Code, 11651.) 
) 
) 
,.-
f·" 
"" ! 
.". , 
I 
Dec. 1966] COLEMAN "ENGINEERING CO. V. 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. 
[65 C.2d 396; 55 Cal.Rptr. I, 420 P.2d 713] 
413 
and engineers of plaintiff [Coleman], defendant's engineers 
for the first time informed plaintiff's engineers that defendant 
desired the trailers to be designed with the payload center of 
gravity 35 inches above the rail top surfaces." The court 
further found that" After the conference on JUly 7, 1959, 
defendant requested plaintiff to continue working on the 
project, the subject matter of the contract, and stated that 
changed specifications- would be forthcoming from defendant 
to plaintiff" and that" At defendant's request, pursuant to 
the contract between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff had 
been performing work and rendering services for defendant 
for defendant's use and benefit. . . ." 
These findings and the testimony in the record are ambigu-
ous as to whether, after the meeting of July 7, the parties had 
" agreed that the '35-inch figure was to be followed, or had only 
decided that the rail height figure was not the proper one. For 
example, :Mr. Nolan, Coleman's project engineer in this case, 
testified on direct examination: 
"Q. Mr. Nolan, so far as the engineering department, you 
were the project engineer, is it or is it not true that there was 
no final decision between North American and Coleman as to 
the location of the center of gravity of the payload so far as 
you know' A. That's right. " 
The witness further testified on direct examination: 
" A. We said this is the way we're going to design it and 
North American people said they wanted the CG, the load 
factors applied to the CG with the height above the rail, the . 
center of gravity which was a number that we didn't know 
exactly how high the CG was. 
"Q. Did North American say they knew' A. No, they 
didn't know how high it was exactly but they knew it was in 
the neighborhood of 36 inches and so it was arranged . . . to. 
be phoned back. " 
On cross-examination, :Mr. Nolan testified further regarding 
the meeting: 
"Q. And then, that same afternoon, Mr. Burcombe tele-
phoned you and gave you 35.25 inches CG height above the 
rails Y A. Yes. . . . 
"Q. You knew on July 7th, didn't you, that the Coleman 
design placing the CG of the pay load at rail height and 
applying the load factors at that point, would not meet the 
side loads if the pay load CG were placed 35 inches above the 
rails' . . . THE 'V ITNESS: Yea." 
) 
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Mr. Burcombe, a North American project engineer, testified 
on direct examination that at the July 7 conference Mr. Nolan 
"brought up the matter of CG. He said their stress people had 
been figuring that the CG was located at rail height and 
having seen the missile, he knew intuitively that it was not at 
rail height-that it was some distance above this, and he 
requested us to determine or give him the figure of what it 
should be. I knew it was somewhere in the neighborhood of 36 
or 37 or 38 inches, but to be sure, I told him we would find out 
for sure upon our return and call him back and give him an 
exact figure and it was later confirmed in writing and upon 
return to the North American plant we determined that it was 
35.52 inches above the rails, which I phoned to him, and told 
him that we had confirmed this. We eventually rounded it off 
at 35 inche~. " 
Whether or not a new center of gravity figure had been 
finally agreed upon at this point, there would be no contract. 
On the one hand it may be that the parties simply did not 
know precisely where the center of gravity was to be located, 
in which case there would be no agreement. On the other hand, 
if the understanding was that the 35-inch figure was the 
proper one, still tIl ere would be no agreement. Specifications 
had not yet been supplied, time of performance had not been 
agreed upon, and the very important price term remained to 
be settled. The record makes clear that both parties were of the 
opinion, even before JUly 15, that the precise location of the 
payload center of gravity was to be an essential element of 
their contract.s 
Nothing in the record suggests that the parties agreed to go 
ahead on the basis of the original rail-height specification until 
SA Coleman interoffice memorandum dated July 8 states that placing 
the payload center of gravity at 35 inches above the rails "will prae-
tically double the loads on most of the members and cause most of the 
stress work performed to date to be recalculated. A lot of redesign will 
ha ve to be performed as a result of the increased member sizes, the 
fabrication costs will increase due to material sizes increases, and the 
schedule will suffer a delay. 
"A cost estimate is being prepared for these changes and little work 
can be performl>d that will not be affected by the above changes." 
Coleman '8 project engineer, Mr. Nolan, testified that his opinion as of 
July 8 was that if the payload center of gravity were to be placed at 
35 inches above the rails it would "cause most of the stress work per-
formed to date to be recalculated," "a lot of redesign would have to be 
performed," "the fabrication cost will increase," "the schedule will 
suffer a delay," and" little work [could] be performed that would not 
he affected by the changes 011 this project." Mr. Nolan further testified 
that the engineering necessary to place the payload center of gravity at 
the point specified in the telephone call of July 8 "would be. entirely 
i 
! ,..-
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some formal change was made. In the interoffice memorandum 
of July 8, Coleman instructed its contract administrator to 
call North American's buyer" and ask him to send us a letter 
or a change to the specifications defining where they want the 
center of gravity, if not at the top of the load rails." (Italics 
added.) Such an inquiry would have been meaningless had 
Coleman actually intended to proceed with building a trailer 
with the payload center of gravity at rail height. 
Coleman's pleadings are also instructive. They indicate, not 
that Coleman intended to proceed on a rail-height basis until 
further notice, but that it planned to build the trailers accord-
ing to some other specification-somewhere in the area of 35 
inches above rail height-which was still to be supplied. In its 
complaint Coleman alleged that "defendant orally informed 
plaintiff that a change in specifications would be furnished so 
that a trailer unit would be produced that would do the job 
contemplated." Coleman further alleged that "Plaintiff, rely-
ing on the advice the defendant had previously given it, as 
above alleged, had been proceeding on the contract for some 
time on the basis of the changed specifications even bcfore the 
written changed specifications were received." And in its pre-
trial statement, Coleman stated that "plaintiff, based on the 
request of North American to proceed with the design and 
engineering work, did proceed with this engineering and 
design work to design a positioning trailer with the center of 
gravity 35 inches above rail height. " 
The understanding of North American in this regard is also 
clear. The following testimony was elicited from Mr. Bur-
combe on cross-examination by Coleman: 
"Q. Sir, would you have expected Coleman Engineering 
after July 8th, 1959, to have made a drawing of the parts of 
the positioning trailer with the CG at rail height, after the 
conferences you had 7 A. We wouldn't expect them to, no. 
" Q. You would have expected them to have been drafting 
along the lines you suggested and requested, isn't that right Y 
A. 'Designing to our interpretation of the specifications, plac-
ing CG at 35 inches above the top of the rail. 
"Q. You certainly wouldn't expect them after that confer-
different" from that required to build a trailer with a payload center 
of gravity at rail height. 
North American's project engineer, Mr. Burcombe, testifiec1 on cross-
examination that the missing specification of a verticlll payload center 
of &,ravity was an "important" and "very significant" dimension in 
thie case. 
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ence to go ahead on the other interpretation, would you, sir! 
A. I wouldn't expect them to, no. 
"Q. It would have been a waste of time, isn't that right! A. 
That's right. " 
In these circumstances I cannot conclude that on JUly 15 
Coleman intended to enter into a contract to build a trailer 
according to its own design despite its knowledge that, in the 
words of Coleman's own engineer, "it was not what they 
[North American] wanted, that they wanted the design load 
applied at a high CG, some distance above the rails." This 
knowledge gained by the Coleman engineers at the July 7 
meeting is, of course, imputed to the corporation (Ban/ran 00. 
v. Rees Blow Pipe M/g. 00., 168 Cal.App.2d 191, 204-205 [335 
P.2d 995] ; cf. Civ. Code § 2332). 
Thus, w:hen the purchase orders were signed on July 15, 
Coleman knew that the specification intended by North Amer-
ican was not for a payload center of gravity at rail height. In 
signing the purchase orders with this knowledge, it could not 
purport to accept an offer describing a center of gravity at rail 
height. (17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 146, pp. 493-494; 
3 Corbin, Contracts (1960 ed.) § 609; Ex parte Perusini Oonst. 
00., 242 Ala. 632, 636 [7 So.2d. 576]. Cf. Lemoge Electric v. 
County 0/ Ban Mateo, 46 Ca1.2d 659, 662-663 [297 P.2d 638] ; 
Brunzell Oonstr. Oo~ v. G. J. Weisbrod, Inc., 134 Cal.App.2d 
278, 286 [285 P.2d 989].) For the same reasons, North Ameri-
can could not maintain that Coleman had agreed to perform 
according to new specifications but at the original bid price. 
North American" was fully aware, before July 15, that Coleman 
had bid on the basis of a payload center of gravity at rail 
height and that Coleman's position was that changes would 
be required in cost and price terms and in the time schedule. 
The actions of both parties after July 15 demonstrated that 
the price, time of performance, and specifications for the 
center of gravity were not regarded as settled from the outset. 
Both parties treated the contract as an agreement to agree,' 
relying on the change clause of the purchase orders as a basis 
for adjustment in specifications, price, and time of perform-
ance through future negotiations. After July 15 there were 
numerous negotiations concerning these open terms. 
4 In his opening statement to the trial court, Coleman's attomel stated: 
"Now, have in mind, I know the eases are legend that holds [sicJ that an 
agreement to hold in the future is no agreement at all •.. I wonder it 
that is where we are. An agreement to agree. Assuming that's where we 
are, then, of course, we will be left with a quantum meruit. • • ." 
) 
c 
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Agreements to agree are valid and enforceable if unessential 
elements only are reserved for the future agreement. "The 
general rule is that if an 'essential element' of a promise is 
reserved for the future agreement of both parties, the promise 
gives rise to no legal obligation until such future agreement is 
made." (Oity of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Ca1.2(1 
423,433 [333 P.2d 745]. See lVong v. Di Grazia, 60 Ca1.2d 525, 
539 [35 Ca1.Rptr. 241, 386 P.2d 817] ; Apablasa v. Merritt d'; 
Co., supra, 176 Cal.App.2d 719, 730; Putman v. Cameron, 129 
Cal.App.2d 89, 95 [276 P.2d 102] ; Avalon Products, Inc. v. 
Lentini, 98 Cal.App.2d 177, 179 [219 P.2d 485]; 1 Corbin, 
Contracts (1963 ed.) § 29, pp. 84-85.) 
Whether a term is "essential" "depends upon the relative 
importance and the severability of the matter left to the 
future; it is a question of degree. . . ." (Oity of Los Angeles 
v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 423, 433 [333 P.2d 745].) The 
relative importance of a term may turn in part upon the 
intentions of the p·arties. (See 1 Corbin, Contracts (1963 ed.) 
§ 29, pp. 89-90.) When, however, "a contract is so uncertain 
and indefinite that the intention of the parties in material 
particulars cannot be ascertained, the contract is void and 
unenforceable. " (California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union 
Sugar Co., 45 Ca1.2d 474, 481 [289 P.2d 785, 49 A.L.R.2d 496]. 
See also Ellis v. KlafJ, 96 Cal.App.2d 471,478 [216 P.2d 15].) 
At times, subsequent conduct of the parties may establish the 
contours of an agreement that appeared uncertain at its incep-
tion and thus render it enforceable. (Bohman v. Berg, 54 
Ca1.2d 787, 794-795 [8 Cal.Rptr. 441, 356 P.2d 185].) The 
history of the Coleman-North American negotiations, however, 
establishes just the contrary; the course of events magnified 
and made clearer the original uncertainty of their agreement 
and intentions concerning many essential details. Neither 
design specifications, price, nor time of performance had been 
agreed upon, nor were they ever finally agreed upon~ and the 
parties' extended negotiations demonstrate that they deemed 
both the specifications5 and price6 to be essential. Since both 
5Lack of agreement concerning specifications, especially where, as 
here, they deal with the design of a major element constituting the object 
of the contract, may vitiate any attempt upon the part of the parties to 
have an enforceable agreement. (See Colorado Corp. v. Smith, 121 Cal. 
App.2d 374, 376·377 [263 P.2d 79]; 1 Williston, Contracts (3d ed.) 
I 42, :pp. 135·136; cf. Putman v. Cameron, 8upra, 129 Cal.App.2d 89, 
95-96.> 
6It has been held that when the price term is expressly left to be agreed 
0$ C.2d-l. 
) 
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of these terms as well as the time of performance 7 were left to 
future agreement, there can be no question that essential ele .. 
ments were left to be agreed upon. The open terms were the 
very substance of the contemplated contract. 
Under these circumstances, the change clause of the pur .. 
chase orders cannot give rise to a contract, for without an 
initial agreement on the essential terms the:re are no standards 
to govern the meaning of the change clause. The change clause 
itself is then affected by the basic uncertainty that precludes 
the existence of a contract. The parties may not invoke the 
change clause, designed to meet unforeseen contingencies, to 
make a contract when there has been no agreement from the 
outset on essential matters. 
Since no contract arose when Coleman acknowledged the 
purchase orders, the trial court erred in awarding damages 
pursuant' to the termination clause in those orders. When 
performance is rendered by one party in the mistaken belief 
that an enforceable contract exists, his remedy is in quantum 
meruit. (See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960 ed.) § 599, pp. 593-595, 
fn. 22, citing Peerless Glass 00. v. Pacific etc. Co., 121 Cal. 
641, 647 [54 P. 101].) Ordinarily, the measure of recovery is 
the reasonable value of benefits conferred upon the other 
party. (Ohallenge Oream &- Butter Assn. v._ Royal Dutch, 
Dairies, 212 Cal.App.2d 901, 908 [28 Cal.Rptr. 448]; Town-
send Pierson, Inc. v. Holly-Coleman 00., 178 Cal.App.2d 373, 
378 [2 Cal.Rptr. 812] ; Major-Blakeney Oorp. v. Jenkins, 121 
Cal.App.2d 325, 340 [263 P.2d 655].) If the other party 
received no benefit, there is ordinarily no obligation to make 
restitution. (Ibid.) 
In the present case it does not appear that North American 
benefited by Coleman's performance. Nevertheless, after the 
upon, there is no contract until agreement is reached. (California Let-
tuce Growers, Inc. v. Uni01l. Sugar 00., supra, 45 Cal.2d 474, 481-482; 
Avalon Products, Inc. v. Lentini, supra, 98 Cal.App.2d 177, 179-180; 
Noel v. Dum01l.t Builders, Inc" 178 Ca1.App.2d 691, 696 [3 Cal.Rptr. 
~20]; Beech Aircraft Oo-rp. v. Ross (lOth Cir. 1946) 155 F.2d 615, 618.) 
Although this rule has been abrogated in the area of contracts for the 
Rale of goods (Com. Code, § 2305), the comments to that section point 
out that, at least in part, the change relies on other unique features of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. (See Com. Code, § 2305; Uniform Com- ----
mercial Code, com. 1.) 
7 Although in the absence of a specified date, courts will imply a reason-
able time for performance (Wong v. Di Grazia, supra, 60 Ca1.2d 525, 
:i36), the absence of a specified time contributes to the uncertainty aa 
to whether there was an agreement. (Compare HcmcOCM OU 00. v. 
McClellMl, 135 Cal.App.2d 667, 670 [288 P.2d 39].) 
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misunderstanding as to the center of gravity was discovered at 
the JUly 7 conference, Coleman continued to perform at North 
American's express request. Had the contemplated contract 
envisaged the performance of services instead of the produc-
tion of trailers, there would be no doubt that Coleman could 
,recover the reasonable value of its work whether or not it 
benefited North American. When one person performs services 
at the request of another, the law raises an obligation to pay 
the reasonable value of the services. (Williams v. Dougan, 175 
Cal.App.2d 414, 418 [346 P.2d 241J.) The Restatement of 
Restitution rationalizes this rule with the requirement that a 
benefit can be conferred as a prerequisite to restitution by 
stating that a benefit is conferred upon another if a person 
."performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other, 
... " (See Rest., Restitution, § 1, com. b, p. 12. Italics 
added.) Although ,this rule has usually been applied when 
services or work and labor were requested in their own right, 
rather than as incidental to the construction of a specified item 
to be sold to the defendant (see Williams v. Dougan, supra, 
175 Cal.App.2d 414; Bodmer v. Turnage, 105 Cal.App.2d 475, 
477-478 [233 P.2d 157]), there is no basis for limiting the rule 
to the performance of services. If in fact the ~ performance of 
services has conferred no benefit on the person requesting 
them, it is pure fiction to base restitution on a benefit con-
ferred. "[I]t is submitted that allowing a recovery in these 
cases on a theory of benefit conferred is purely fictional, and 
that the real basis is a moral obligation to restore to his origi-
nal position a party who has acted to his detriment in reliance 
on a representation, technically unenforceable, by another that 
he will give value for the detriment suffered." (Note (1928) 
26 Mich.L.Rev. 942, 943.) 
In Kearns v. Andree, 107 Conn. 181 [139 A. 695, 59 A.L.R. 
599], the court allowed the plaintiff recovery for services per-
formed at the request of the defendant, explicitly recognizing 
that no benefit was conferred upon the defendant. The defend-
ant had agreed to buy the plaintiff's building and at the 
defendant's request the plaintiff made alterations in the build-
ing in preparation for its transfer to the defendant. The 
defendant refused to buy the building and the agreement was 
held to be too indefinite for enforcement. The plaintiff was 
nevertheless allowed to recover, the reasonable value of his 
services, without regard to the fact that no benefit was con-
ferred upon the defendant. The court held that recovery of the 
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reasonable value of services. performed, without regard to 
actual benefit, should be allowed "where the parties have 
attempted to make a contract which is void because its terms 
are too indefinite, but where one party has, in good faith, and 
believing that a valid contract existed, performed part of the 
services which he had promised in reliance upon it." (la. at 
pp. 187·188.) 
Kearf&S v. Anaree has been cited approvingly8 and has been 
recently followed in another jurisdiction. (See Abrams v. 
Financial8ervice Co., 13 Utah 2d 343,346 [374 P.2d 309].) In 
my opinion, it should be followed here. When two parties 
mistakenly believe that a contract exists between them, but the 
agreement is too uncertain and indefinite to be enforced, the 
one rendering performance and incurring expenses at the 
request of the other should receive reasonable compensation 
therefor' without regard to benefit conferred upon the other. 
Such a rule places the loss where it belongs-on the party 
whose requests induced performance in justifiable reliance on 
the belief that the requested performance would be paid for. 
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case to the 
trial court to determine the damages pursuant to the foregoing 
rule.- : 
Mosk, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
25, 1967. White, J.,. sat in place of Tobriner, J., who deemed 
himself disqualified. Traynor, C. J., and Mosk, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
8See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960 ed.) § 599, p. 595, In. 22; Fuller & 
Perdue, The ReliaftCtJ Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 Yale L.J. 
(1937) 373, 395-396; Note (1928) supra, 26 Mich_L.Rev. 942, 943-944. 
-Retired Associate Justice of tile Supreme Court sitting under assign---
ment of the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
